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Russian Rationality: Understanding Sanctions
and Decision-Making Processes in Russia
By Rebecca L. Smith, Arcadia University

Introduction
In March 2014, the approximately two million people living in the Ukrainian peninsula
of Crimea were ‘reunified’ with Russia.1 The
international community responded by placing sanctions on Russia to persuade the state
into changing its policy toward Crimea and
Ukraine. Sanctions are a tool used by states
and intergovernmental bodies typically designed to “coerce, deter, punish, or shame entities that endanger their interests or violate
international norms of behavior”.2 However,
the sanctions do not appear to have caused
any change in Russia’s foreign policy actions
to date. This begs the question; how might
one best understand Russian foreign policy
decision-making concerning Crimea and their
response to the retaliatory economic sanctions?
To examine this, I use expected utility theory
and prospect theory – two psychological theories that have been adapted to economics and
international relations. Following a discussion
of each theory and the explanation each offers
for decision-making behavior, I apply each
theory to pertinent speeches and events to
investigate which theory offers the best explanation for Russian foreign policy decision-making. Ultimately, I conclude that prospect
theory offers the best framework for understanding Russian foreign policy decision-mak-

ing behavior vis-à-vis Crimea and the economic
sanctions. An improved understanding of how
states make decisions with respect to sanctions
is useful in contributing to the overall debate
about whether sanctions are an effective tool to
provoke change from other states.
Background
On March 16, 2014, in a referendum condemned by the West as illegitimate, 97% of
voters in Crimea voted to secede from Ukraine
and join the Russian Federation. Following the
referendum, leaders of Western states, including the U.S. and EU member states, warned
Russian President Vladimir Putin against
absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation
and imposed a travel ban and asset freezes
on key Russian officials to deter such action.
Despite the warnings and outrage at potential
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, President
Putin signed a bill to annex Crimea into Russia
on March 18, 2014.3 Official sanctions on Russia
soon followed from the EU, US, and a host of
other countries, including Australia, Iceland,
Japan, and Norway. Many of these countries
are Russia’s largest trading partners.4
States have since scaled up the sanctions several times in addition to blacklisting
several senior Russian officials and select companies. These sanctions specifically target the
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businesses and people closest to decision-making power in Russia. The main focuses are
state finances, oil firms, and the arms sector.
The EU and US also chose to target specific
individuals and companies with connections to
President Putin’s inner circle.5 Overall, sanctioning states aim to place sanctions severe
enough that they will encourage a change in
Russian policy, but narrow enough that they
harm those closest to Russian decision-making
power rather than the average Russian. These
sanctions have contributed to the current political and economic climate confronting decision-makers in Russia today.

Expected Utility Theory

Theory

There are five central axioms that sum up the
core of EUT:

The implementation of these sanctions has
sparked a debate over whether sanctions work,
and more narrowly, whether sanctions work on
Russia. This debate revolves around two central themes: the extent of economic impact on
Moscow and whether the sanctions are enough
to change Russia’s behavior.6 However, an examination of Moscow’s view towards the sanctions
is missing from this discussion. It is important
to understand the Russian perspective, since
the real decision-making power for change rests
with Moscow. This section, therefore, offers two
theories that may be useful in understanding
Russian decision-making behavior with respect
to the economic sanctions. The fundamental
point of contention within these theories revolves
around the idea of rational choice.

One theory that may help explain Russian
foreign policy decision-making behavior with
respect to economic sanctions is expected utility
theory (EUT). EUT assumes two fundamental
aspects about decision makers. First, it accepts
that actors are rational, and therefore make logical decisions to maximize their benefit. Second,
EUT assumes that actors consider the probability of possible outcomes. When dealing with
uncertain outcomes, EUT states that decision
makers will consider various options based on
each option’s expected utility.7

1.Decision makers are rational. Actors order
various outcomes in terms of preferences.
2.This order of preferences is transitive
Actors will rank preferences so that A is a
more favored outcome than B, which the
actor prefers to C, D, E, and so forth. If the
cost of preference A outweighs its benefits, a
rational actor would choose option B.
3.Decision makers know the subjective
value, or the utility, of their actions.
4.Actors consider outcomes through exa
ining both the utility of the outcome and the
probability of success.
5.Decision makers always select the optio
with the greatest expected utility.
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This theory is consistent with the logic behind
implementing economic sanctions. The sanctioning party or parties inherently assume the
rationality of the target and that negotiations
will follow the sanctions, eventually leading to
a desired goal.9 In the realm of economic decision-making, the most important consideration is
considering short-term financial prospects when
deciding whether to take a risk for a long-term
financial gain.10
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (PT) emerged as an alternative
to EUT in 1979. Rather than rationally considering the utility and probability of an outcome,
PT posits that actors make decisions from a personal reference point and fear losses more than
gains, even when each outcome has the same
probability of occurring.11

interms of loss makes the situation direr,
due to loss aversion.
5. Decision-makers tend to overweight
small probabilities and underweight
high probabilities.
6. Decision-makers tend to simplify choices,
cancelling out options that seem similar.12
Generally, PT argues that decision-makers
consider options from their own reference
point, fear loss, and frame prospective choices
in terms of gains or losses. Figure 1 represents
the relationship between loss aversion and
framing. When actors frame a potential outcome with high probability as a loss, they are
more likely to take risks than a high-probability potential outcome in the domain of gains.
This is because decision-makers are desperate

There are six major tenets to PT:
1. Individuals think in terms of gains and
losses of a decision from a reference point
rather than the net outcome.
2. Actors think about gains and losses
diffeently. Decision-makers are less likely to
take risks for potential gains and more
likely to take risks to prevent loss.
3. Actors dislike losing possessions more
than they like winning a similar thing they do
not possess (loss aversion). This tendecy to
over-value possessions is the endoment effect.
4. Since actors make decisions from a
refe ence point, the framing of a problem is
criical. Framing is the interpretation of a
siuation that a decision-maker uses to
respond to events. Framing a situation

Figure 1

to avoid significant losses. The opposite is true,
however, in a low-probability situation.
Analysis
To understand whether either expected utility theory or prospect theory offers a helpful
framework for understanding Russian
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decision-making behavior in relation to the economic sanctions in retaliation to the annexation
of Crimea, I apply the major tenants of each
theory to key speeches and events. This investigation, while limited by the knowledge available regarding the Russian decision-making
process, shows that prospect theory provides
the better explanation.
Applied Expected Utility Theory
There are several aspects that one would expect
to see while using EUT as a framework to understand Russian foreign policy decision-making
in response to the economic sanctions. Among
these are the consideration of alternate outcomes
with respect to preferences and the probability
of each outcome occurring, the perusal of actions
in order of favored outcomes, and for Russia to
always choose the outcome that will yield the
highest utility. Most importantly, EUT expects
that Russia will always rationally weigh the
probability of success and the utility of a potential outcome before choosing an action.
Does Russia meet these benchmarks?
While it is impossible to truly know everything
President Putin and his advisors considered
when choosing whether to annex Crimea, one
can make observations about the utility of
Crimea to Russia. Fischer and Rogoza outline
the benefits of the annexation: strengthening
support for Vladimir Putin, natural gas and
crude oil reserves, ownership of the Crimean
tourist infrastructure and other industries, and
broad access to the Black Sea.13 While it is true
that the annexation did boost Mr. Putin’s approval rating, it is important to note that it was
also very high before the annexation. Since 2000,

his approval ratings have fluctuated between
60% and 90%.14 Putting this in perspective, President Putin’s lowest approval ratings are still
higher than President Obama’s highest approval ratings.15 He did not need to annex Crimea
to save approval rating because it was never
in jeopardy. Similarly, Russia does not need
Crimea for oil or natural gas reserves. Russia is
already the world’s second highest producer of
fossil fuels, and estimates suggest Russia accounts for more than 80% of the world’s energy
supply and has a 455-year supply of coal.16
Russia in no way needs to depend on Crimea for
energy resources.
Additionally, the annexation itself spoiled
much of the benefit Russia could have received
from Crimean industry. Industry in Crimea
has suffered, especially tourism, and more than
three-quarters of the region’s international
investments have pulled out of the area.17 More
access to the Black Sea, nonetheless, does still
provide Russia with some utility for military
infrastructure. However, the vast majority of the
identified benefits to acquiring Crimea were not
actually very important for Russian interests.
Therefore, Crimea has rationally low utility to
Russia. Furthermore, Russia’s decision to move
ahead with the annexation despite warnings
from its biggest international trading partners
shows that decision-makers did not rationally
weigh the costs and benefits of success. Thus,
Russian decision-making around the annexation
does not reflect the third tenet of EUT.
While planning to reclaim Crimea began
three weeks before the referendum during an allnight meeting with security advisors is initially
consistent with the second tenet of EUT
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giving Mr. Putin and his advisors the benefit of
the doubt that they strategically considered their
plan), failing to adapt from the point that the
international community warned Russia forward
fails to reflect this axiom.18 President Putin failed
to consider the potential negative effects of the
economic sanctions before continuing with the
plan to bring Crimea back into Russia. This is
not consistent with the second axiom of EUT because it increases the cost of Russia’s first preference (annexation) and Russia failed to choose an
alternative, transitively ranked preference.
However, later actions are more consistent with this second tenet of EUT. While not
initially adapting to the threat of economic
sanctions, the negotiations on the Ukrainian
conflict in Minsk, Belarus in February 2015
does appear to align with the EUT notion that
actors will pursue transitively ranked preferences. In exchange for the resumption of
economic relations (this does not mean an end
to the sanctions, however), Russia agreed to a
ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, the withdrawal of
weapons, and Ukrainian control of the border
by the end of 2015.19 Such negotiations as the
Minsk Agreement appear in accordance with
EUT. Russia eventually realized the cost of its
actions outweighed the benefits, and therefore
Russia decided to enter negotiations to move
towards a less desired, but overall more beneficial option. Adapting to the situation appears
consistent with the transitively-ranked preferences component of EUT.
However, analysis also indicates that
Russia never fully considered the utility of its

actions, the fifth tenet of EUT. Objectively,
Crimea provides very little benefit to Russia
and comes with a very high price tag. In 2014,
Russia spent 125 billion rubles on Crimea. In
2016, the country announced plans to invest 680
billion rubles in Crimea by 2020.20 On top of this
expense, Russia faces the damaging effects of
the economic sanctions. Russia’s GDP fell 3.7%
in 2015 and while the county did experience
some growth in 2016, it has still not recovered to
its pre-sanctions GDP.21 Additionally, inflation
is rising and the value of the ruble is dropping.
Combined with Russia’s ban on food imports
form the EU and U.S. (in retaliation of the sanctions), has caused a sharp increase in the price
of food.22 Failing to consider the costs of annexation and properly weigh the negligible benefits
is inconsistent with the fourth and fifth axioms
of EUT. President Putin and his advisors did not
consider potential outcomes by examining both
the utility of the outcome and the probability of
success, nor did they select the option with the
greatest expected utility.
Generally, an examination of Russian
decision-making behavior seems very inconsistent with the central axioms of EUT. Therefore,
EUT does not appear to be a good explanation
of Russian decision-making behavior regarding
sanctions and the annexation of Crimea.
Applied Prospect Theory
Prospect theory, as an alternative to expected
utility theory, allows for decision-makers to act
outside of strictly rational thought. With re pect
to Russian decision making vis-à-vis the economic
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sanctions and Crimea, there are several components that one would expect to see when using
prospect theory as a framework. First, one
would expect Russian perception of reality to
play a bigger role in decision-making processes
than objective, rational thought. The fear of loss
would also play a role in explaining Russian
actions. This loss aversion would also lead to
the over-valuation of “possessions.” Finally, one
would also expect to see framing of choices in
terms of gains or losses. These concepts, applied
to key events and speeches, appear useful in
understanding Russian decision-making behavior around the economic sanctions.
The idea of loss has surrounded much of
President Putin’s rhetoric regarding the annexation of Crimea. If consistent with PT, this
loss aversion would also lead to the over-valuation of possessions. Per Rudy and Venteicher,
States are willing to fight to defend the
same territory they would not fight to
acquire in the first place. In such cases,
states fight to defend their territory because
they value it more due primarily to the fact
that they own/control the land (as suggested
by the endowment effect), and possible
losses generates more risk acceptant behavior
due to loss aversion.23
In this case, Crimea is the “overvalued possession” that Russia is willing to accept risk
and potential loss to defend. Since Crimea is
historically Russian territory, Putin views it
as rightfully belonging to the Russian Federation rather than Ukraine.24 This is consistent
with Russia’s willingness to spend billions on

the tiny peninsula while also struggling due to
economic sanctions.
A Standard and Poor’s estimate claims
Russia would have to pour approximately one
billion dollars into Crimea annually to bring
the living standard up to Russian standards.
Furthermore, Crimea needs most of its energy,
drinking water, and food imported. In addition
to the costs of merely maintaining Crimea,
there are also costs associated with integrating it into the Russian Federation. This coupled with a steep decline in Crimea’s tourism
industry – the largest sector of the Crimean
economy – makes the cost of Crimea substantial.25 Despite this cost, Vladimir Putin maintains his position on Crimea, clearly stating,
“I believe we did the right thing and I don’t
regret anything.”26 He claims the annexation
righted a historical wrong – namely, that
Crimea always belonged to Russia rather than
Ukraine.27 The massive amount of money and
resources Russia is willing to pour into a tiny
peninsula in the Black Sea appears rationally
disproportional. The endowment effect helps
to explain the motivation behind such a risky
action. This is particularly evident in President Putin’s justifications for the annexation
because Crimea is historically part of Russia.
This is also an example of loss aversion because Mr. Putin’s justification for the annexation deals directly with Russia’s historical
possession of Crimea. This is consistent with
the first and third tenets of PT.
According to PT, the desperation to repossess Crimea makes Russia risk-seeking. The
willingness to endure economic hardship to
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hold on to Crimea already reflects some risky
behavior. Russia not only consistently stands
behind the actions that led to the sanctions
in the first place, but encourages similar
actions in other historically Russian regions.
Shortly before the one-year anniversary of the
Crimean annexation, President Putin signed
an agreement to create a common security
space and open boarder with South Ossetia,
a breakaway region of Georgia. Critics of this
arrangement equate it with a Russian annexation of South Ossetia. Russia also supports
the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk in
eastern Ukraine.28 These actions all share
similarities with the actions that led to the
sanctions in the first place. This demonstrates
risk-seeking behavior, which suggests that PT
offers a fitting explanation regarding Russia’s
framing of the situation in terms of potential
loss of Crimea. This risk-seeking behavior
reflects the second precept of PT.
Additionally, PT would also expect to
see framing of choices in terms of gains or
losses. This is evident in the Russian framing of the situation to fear the loss of Crimea
more than loss from economic sanctions. As
discussed above, Putin already frames loss of
Crimea is a terrible injustice. The economic
consequences of the sanctions, however, do
not receive an equally negative framing. On
the one-year anniversary of the annexation,
marked by a huge celebration in Moscow,
Putin acknowledged that the sanctions are
“not fatal, but naturally damage our ongoing
work.”29 He went on to argue that the sanctions are worth any ensuing struggle because
of what Russia would lose if it submitted to
the coercion of the sanctions. In his speech,

frames this potential loss by saying, “The
issue at stake was the sources of our history, our spirituality and our statehood – the
things that make us a single people, and a
single, united nation.”30 Putin’s statement
reflects an awareness of the harmful effects of
the sanctions. However, by referring to Russia’s “ongoing work,” he also alludes to the
notion that Russia is not willing to change its
policy to bring an end to the sanctions. Putin
therefore frames loss from economic sanctions
as second to the potential loss of Crimea.
Thus, the possession of Crimea is Russia’s
point of reference and Russia fears losing
Crimea a second time in this instance. This is
consistent with the fourth tenet of PT.
On the other hand, Russia also faces
potential harm from the international community’s sanctions. Since Russia fears losing
Crimea, they risk economic harm from these
sanctions. This harm manifested in several ways since the implementation of the
sanctions, including a credit rating cut from
Standard & Poor’s, a steep devaluation of
the ruble, inflation, a decline in foreign investment, falling bond prices, a reduction in
economic growth, and a rise in geopolitical
tensions.31 The desperation to prevent the loss
of Crimea, combined with the high-probability of loss due to the economic sanctions and
international pressure places Russia in the
upper left quadrant of the graph in Figure
1. Forgoing objective and rational thought
through the evident overvaluation of Crimea
and the underweighting of potential harm
from the sanctions is consistent with the fifth
rule of PT. Prospect Theory’s framework for
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decision-making appears to offer a useful
explanation for understanding Russian
decision-making behavior in this case. Loss
aversion and the endowment effect describe
why Russia so adamantly seeks to keep and
support a territory that offers it such little
benefit in return, even in the face of risking
high financial loss. Moreover, it also offers
an explanation for Russian risk-seeking behavior in similar situations since the implementation of the sanctions.
Towards a Better Understanding
In this case, PT offers a more useful understanding of Russian decision-making
behavior than EUT. With respect to the
sanctions meant to coerce Russia into changing its behavior toward Crimea, rational
decision-making does not appear evident, as
Russia celebrates the annexation of a region
with no noteworthy benefits, despite significant negative financial effects of the sanctions. However, President Putin’s rhetoric
shows that he does not frame the situation
in terms of logical net gains, but rather in
terms of the potential loss of Crimea – a Russian “possession.” Russia is willing to risk
the financial harm of the sanctions because
it fears losing Crimea. This is more consistent with the framework PT offers for understanding decision-making behavior than that
of EUT.
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Conclusion
Prospect Theory offers the clearest explanation for understanding Russian foreign
policy decision-making behavior vis-à-vis
the economic sanctions and the annexation
of Crimea. This contributes to a comprehension of how states respond to sanctions. In
the case of economic sanctions on Russia, PT
explains how Russia is willing to accept high
financial costs to prevent the loss of Crimea.
However, it is also important to note the limitations of this study. As the sanctions are
relatively new, it is difficult to fully assess
their complete effects at this point in time.
Prospect Theory offers the clearest explanation for understanding Russian foreign
policy decision-making behavior vis-à-vis
the economic sanctions and the annexation
of Crimea. This contributes to a comprehension of how states respond to sanctions. In
the case of economic sanctions on Russia, PT
explains how Russia is willing to accept high
financial costs to prevent the loss of Crimea.
However, it is also important to note the limitations of this study. As the sanctions are
relatively new, it is difficult to fully assess
their complete effects at this point in time.
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